

# **Mongolia and China: New Challenges in Human Security [1]**

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## .01. INTRODUCTION (Return to Index)

China and Mongolia have had long historical relations, and during the Cold War, their affairs were dependent on the state of the Sino-Soviet relationship. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mongolia established a constitutional democracy \*, and attempted to broaden its foreign relations to break out of geographically imposed isolation. Fears of Chinese domination are a constant major driving force in Mongolia's domestic and foreign policy. The demographic challenge of nearly 1.3 billion Chinese next to 2,650,952 [2] Mongolians, the suspicions driven by Han assimilation of once-majority Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, the growing Chinese domination of the cashmere trade, and fear of Chinese expansion all play a significant part in contemporary Sino-Mongolia relations, although officials regard overt anti-Chinese expression as counter-productive, and possibly provocative.

At present, Mongolia enjoys correct relations with China. Since the Soviet collapse, Mongolia has reformed, with help from several countries and the major international monetary and aid

agencies, its economy and political system. Similar to other countries in the region, Mongolia watches China grow into an economic giant that will affect its own economy. In addition, the Beijing government's loosening past restrictions on emigration from China has meant a huge outflow of millions seeking a better life. While Mongolia is rarely the final destination of Chinese economic migrants, the long border and low population density make the country vulnerable to penetration.

Moreover, the precedent of Inner Mongolia, a province-level region of the PRC, does not instill confidence among (Outer) Mongolians. In that border region, ethnic Mongolians were once the majority, but large numbers of ethnic Chinese migrants have transformed them into a minority. Also, over-grazing and cultivation of the grasslands have contributed to desertification of large areas. For the Mongolian Republic, the Chinese threat is demographic and economic, not military or political.

## .02. POST-1949 BACKGROUND (Return to Index)

The MPR (Mongolian People's Republic) was one of the first countries to recognize the PRC, and during the 1950s, amicable relations prevailed. In 1952, economic relationships were restored after a lapse of 30 years. On May 31, 1960 Zhou Enlai and Mongolian President Tsedenbal signed a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance in Ulaanbaatar. Zhou offered a steel plant and a work force of a hundred thousand men, but Mongolia declined, although any additional labor to the country's small population would have been helpful. [6] Settlement of the nearly 5,000 kilometer boundary was also accomplished, with a boundary treaty of December 26, 1962. By this time, Sino-Soviet relations were already in a deep chill – in May, the same year, China withdrew a large number of workers at the request of Mongolia. During the Cultural Revolution, China cut the Beijing-Ulaanbaatar rail link, hurting Mongolia's trade links with Japan that passed through Inner Mongolia, and treating Mongolia as a Soviet proxy.

Sino-Mongolian diplomatic relations were resumed in 1971, following resumption of normalcy between China and the Soviet Union the previous year. Relations remained strained, and in a meeting with Brezhnev in 1974, Tsedenbal described China as chauvinistic. Earlier, in an article marking the MPR's fiftieth anniversary in 1974, Tsedenbal declared that the "Chinese leaders declared bluntly that they looked upon Mongolia as they did Taiwan, which should be returned to China." [9] This referred to Mongolian and Soviet rejection of Chinese proposals in 1949 and 1954 to consolidate Inner Mongolia into the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.

During the first three turbulent decades of the PRC, China was anxious that Mongolia was allied with the Soviet Union, and Mongolia most feared absorption by China. Now that the Soviet Union has disappeared, China's fears have disappeared, but Mongolian apprehensions have increased. The threat is less military, and more economic and demographic, with a contiguous

border between two very different societies – nearly 1.3 billion vs. 2.6 million. And given the fate of growing Inner Mongolia absorption into China, Mongolians are concerned about their cultural, if not national, survival.

### .03. A HUMAN SECURITY APPROACH (Return to Index)

The challenge to Mongolian security is only in small part military. The long term threat to sovereignty and survival is in the realm of human security, or the non-military aspects of survival. In its basic form, human security refers to the safety of individuals, but it has much broader significance. The UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) issued its Human Development program in 1994, and defined human security as follows:\*\*

Human security means that people can exercise choices safely and freely – and they can be fairly confident that the opportunities they have today will not be lost tomorrow. Human security has two main aspects:

Safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression.

Protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities.

The many threats to human security, differing for individuals at different times, fall into seven main categories:

Economic insecurity

Food insecurity

Health insecurity

Personal insecurity

Environmental insecurity

Community and cultural insecurity

Political insecurity

This notion of human security encompasses far more than the immediate safety of individuals, and has implications for a number of structures that have evolved in human society for protection and enhancement of life. These security systems include: family, community, education/knowledge, economy, and state. In addition, the international system as well as regional alliances have taken on human security tasks, and should be considered as part of the complex. At the other end of the complexity scale are individuals themselves, who have the greatest stake in, and are primarily responsible for, their own security. Finally, the natural environment provides the vital context for all human life. When benign, it provides a placid source of air, water, food, and materials for the security of life, and when malign, it is destructive to man and his works, as with floods, drought, typhoons, epidemics, perhaps even asteroids, and other natural calamities beyond human power to counteract.

The range of insecurities identified at the United Nations and the UNDP are pressing issues for Mongolia. Mongolian cultural security – or at least postponement of sinification – is enhanced by Chinese preoccupations in other places, notably Taiwan, giving the government time to strengthen its sovereign existence. Without the Soviet Union to support its independence (even in its adumbrated form during the Soviet satellite period), Mongolian security is in the balance. Continuing economic crises, abetted by a series of severe, livestock-killing winters, and more recently, outbreaks of hoof and mouth disease, not only weaken Mongolian society, but increase vulnerability vis-à-vis the Chinese expanding economy. The incidence of social pathology is increasing in Mongolia and includes juvenile crime, AIDS, family breakdown, and homelessness – phenomena classified as human security threats, and weakening the overall ability to survive and prosper as a sovereign nation-state. With China growing stronger year by year, and Mongolia stagnating or growing much more slowly, there is the worrisome prospect of gradual economic integration, accompanied or followed by demographic overflow, that would weaken Mongolian cultural autonomy, and eventually reduce the country to a Chinese buffer.

#### .04. THE CHINESE CHALLENGE TO MONGOLIAN HUMAN SECURITY (Return to Index)

The Chinese threat is not military, but broadly in the realm of human security. Mongolian cultural identity is secure as long as the modern and sovereign Mongolian nation-state exists. Should that state be absorbed by China, its cultural and ethnic fate would be similar to that of the Zhuangs in Guangxi Autonomous Region, who have been largely assimilated, as have been the Manchus. The Mongols of Inner Mongolia appear to be on the path of absorption by the larger Han population, while Tibetan resistance is opposing the Han political, military, and economic consolidation of territorial frontiers.

Twentieth century Mongolia has had a precarious existence as a sovereign nation-state. During the pro-Soviet period from 1921 to 1991, the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) pursued a policy similar to the traditional Korean *sadae*, or "serving the great". Stationing Soviet troops on Mongolian territory in the 1960s gave geo-strategic advantage to the USSR, providing a strategic offensive point for deployment of Soviet troops to China if necessary. "The Soviet military command ...regarded Mongolia as one of the key strongholds for the likely waging of a war and they considered it extremely important to carry out military operations in the direction of regions with relatively sparse populations inhabited by the minorities of China." [11] The joint Soviet-Chinese statement of 1989 and subsequent agreements ended the Soviet Union "mission to protect Mongolia from China, and both powers agreed not to use or threaten to use force against each other, nor to use the territory, water and air space of a third country with that aim. Total Soviet pull-out from Mongolia was completed in 1992.

The Great Hural (legislature) of Mongolia stated an equidistant policy to its two neighbors in 1994, stressing friendly relations with both. Mongolia has also declared its territory a nuclear-free zone. China has no territorial claims against Mongolia, with all borders settled by the demarcation treaty of December 26, 1962. A lingering concern is that "there is no guarantee that some of the contradictions existing in China's relations with other countries as well as the future development of internal social, political and ethnic controversies will not lead to a situation similar to that in the former Soviet Union." [12] The implication is that China's future external and domestic crises could spill over and affect Mongolia.

Alignment with a strong power to maintain national survival was calculated to prevent absorption first by the Chinese Republic, later by Japanese expansion, and then by the PRC. Today, the only strong power in the region is China, and the outlook for long-term survival is hazy. In a military confrontation between China and Mongolia, the PLA would quickly overpower defending forces, unless the defenders have outside aid.

The Mongolia Ministry of Defense recognizes that military security is only part of the survival equation for the country:

It is believed that the perpetuation of the stagnant situation in the country's development, worsening of the living standards of the people and the predominance of instability in social consciousness pose much more serious threat to Mongolia today than any military threat. The economic crisis, the questionable quality of foodstuffs, price hikes, the absence of modern transport and communication links with the outside world, and the growing pollution of the environment make it imperative to pay more attention to the non-military elements of security. [13]

#### .05. CHINA'S NEW APPROACH TO SECURITY (Return to Index)

What is China's vision of security? Does this vision pose a threat to Mongolia? It is not likely that China takes much comfort in having an independent Mongolia on its border. The nearly seven decades of Soviet sponsorship are not easily forgotten, especially when Soviet weapons and troops had been stationed there for the express purpose of intimidating China. China will not take overt steps to control Mongolia, but neither will it countenance developments that will link the country to future antagonists – including Russia, the U.S., or Japan. Mongolia's destiny is her geography, and now China is the stronger neighbor, tempted to shape that destiny for her own purposes.

Current Chinese strategic writing stresses a more comprehensive concept, incorporating military and economic power, with the latter becoming the more effective mode of advancing national interests. Unspoken is any particular strategy toward Mongolia, but its vulnerability to economic penetration weakens its defences as much as the lack of modern weaponry.

China's formation as a modern sovereign nation-state was preceded by centuries of war and revolution. Peace, in the popular Western view, is the normal, desirable state of existence – war is an aberration, to be prevented and won as quickly as possible. In China, on the other hand, war and the preparation for war have been experiences for millenia. Now that the prospects for world peace are better than the past century, one should expect full attention to the pursuit of peaceful ends, but the normalcy of conflict for China precludes optimism. Security is an elusive goal, and even the most powerful nation on earth, the U.S., is to build new space weapons systems, fusing high technology with defence. In China, the infrastructure for high technology lags behind much of the West and Japan, so a "great leap" is not likely. Instead, economics must be the main instrument of building national strength.

An examination of four articles in the journal of the Chinese Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS), *International Strategic Studies*, illustrates some features of current Chinese

strategic thinking. One is the struggle between hegemony (the U.S.) and anti-hegemony, and between monopolarity and multipolarity. [14] Another feature seen by the Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Institute for International Strategic Studies is that “the convergence and integration of economic and security interests have constituted the strategic basis of the relations among great powers.”[15] He calls for a new concept of security based not on mutual antagonism, nor a zero-sum game of power, but one of cooperative security [16] (though he does not use this term) – in which the security of one’s own country is ensured, and where the security of other countries is not impaired. It is a concept based on the five principles of peaceful co-existence, and reinforces some major changes taking place elsewhere in China.

Another author examines the new multipolar world, [17] and emphasizes the leading position of economic struggle: “Economy represents the base on which world strategic structure is built.”[18] “In the old multipolar world military strength served as the principal leverage to accomplish this job.” Now, countries in an inferior position (socialist and the Third World) have to accelerate their “economic development and strengthen their national comprehensive power before they are able to resist power politics and preserve their national stability.” This economic struggle has eclipsed the military struggle, but has not replaced it.

These two articles are reinforced by “The Struggle between Two Security Concepts.”[19] Luo Renshi sees that traditional security has extended beyond military, with comprehensive security stressing economic security. Together, the articles lay out a progressive vision of world order, stressing national sovereignty, cooperative security, and multipolarity. [20] The U.S. is still seen as the hegemonic power, but the means to limit its power are at hand.

While these views represent a more benign view of the international system than that of the Cold War period – especially during the Cultural Revolution – the assumption is that competition will continue, and sometimes break into conflict. The people’s war approach of Mao Zedong dominated Chinese military thinking until it was rendered obsolete by intensive use of high tech following the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, and decisively with the Gulf War. Following the death of Mao, the military thought of Sun Zi has enjoyed increasing popularity – not only in war studies, but in a wide range of affairs, including business, foreign affairs, crime control, and even economics.

An article by Huang Xin [21] extolled the relevance of Sun Zi (Sun Tzu). He notes that Sun Zi’s injunction to “subdue the enemy without fighting “ requires overall superiority and that the enemy have no will to resist. It also requires that preparations for military struggle and development of military technologies not be slowed down. Huang cites the returns of Hong Kong and Macao to the motherland as exemplifying the superior strategy of “settling the state in security, keeping intact the army and benefiting the world.” Obstacles to reunification with Taiwan include the rise of the Taiwan independence movement and “meddling of the

international powers.”[22] These problems could be managed by strategies of “attacking the enemy’s strategy” or “disrupting his alliances through diplomatic means”.

The author refers to Sun Zi’s emphasis on construction and development of troops, which require finances and territory. After 2500 years, the “fundamental principle of military power relying upon the comprehensive strength of a state remains unchanged.” While these views are not necessarily official, they do reflect mainstream strategic thinking in China today. At the global level, China stresses multipolarity, and at the regional level China must build its economic and military strength, while using its strategic advantages to gain its ends.

For Mongolia, a Chinese conversion to comprehensive security is not comforting. Although it makes military confrontation less likely, it stresses economic growth as a key element of national strength, and justifies deployment of economic resources as security-enhancing. Economic penetration is much more difficult for a poor country to resist, since it usually offers benefits to some sectors of the penetrated society. Finally, economic domination is far less dramatic than military attack, and attracts much less international attention. This is not to say that China has any such agenda for Mongolia, but preservation of sovereignty requires vigilance against piecemeal penetration.

#### .06. MONGOLIA FACES THE HUMAN SECURITY CHALLENGE FROM CHINA (Return to Index)

The Chinese strategic challenge to Mongolia is thus more subtle than an overt military threat. China’s growing economic preponderance and demographic numbers dwarf any resistance from Mongolia if the former decide to occupy the latter. For this reason, Mongolia has been cultivating aid and contacts with organizations such as the IMF and Asian Development Bank, and the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Western Europe and Canada, to diversify partners and implicitly, spotlight any attempt by China to pressure Mongolia. Russia is also a partner, but no longer has the same will and capacity to help as before.

Mongolia’s emergence as a modern nation-state was characterized for seventy years as a protectorate of the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet system, Mongolia seized its sovereignty and set up a democracy. Simultaneously, China has been developing into a regional power based on authoritarianism and a dynamic market economy. Russia undoubtedly wants Mongolia to remain as a sovereign buffer state between itself and China, but is no longer in position to provide much help in a crisis.

The essence of Mongolia’s dilemma is twofold: First, geopolitics renders it vulnerable to its two very large neighbors. Second, when either neighbor is expanding, Mongolia is directly affected. In the Soviet period this meant incorporation into the Communist ideological, political, military, and economic system. During the first decade of the PRC, the Sino-Soviet alliance insured that

the Soviet-imposed status quo in inner Asia would remain intact. With the rift between Moscow and Beijing, Mongolian relations with China also deteriorated. After re-normalization of Sino-Russian relations, Mongolia followed suit. But while the two giants enjoy rough equivalence in military power, Mongolia has no such luxury, and must navigate its diplomacy with extreme sensitivity to the political environment.

## 1. Human Security – the economic dimension

Chinese strategists see integration of economic and security interests as a key development in the post-Cold War era. With the 1979 reforms transforming the Chinese economic system from centrally-planned socialism into more open markets, growth has been consistently high, though accompanied by numerous problems. Some in the West optimistically anticipate that this economic growth will generate a new middle class and pressures for democratization. At the same time, China pragmatically views economic growth as the central component of increasing national strength and as a long-term foundation of strategic advantage.

## 2. Foreign Investment [23]

Mongolia's Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade Agency oversees the more than 1400 foreign corporations from 53 countries. There are 483 joint and single Chinese enterprises in Mongolia in mining, service, agriculture, and light industry. Under law, a joint cooperative enterprise requires a minimum of \$10,000 [24]; also one person could own multiple companies. Most Chinese companies are small, and a re-registration of foreign companies in 1999 revealed that nearly 50% of them were in non-compliance with the law, which was passed in 1991, and amended in 1993. The Great Hural is considering new legislation, which will require a minimum of \$50,000 investment.

Mongolia depends on the dynamic Chinese economy, and the government hopes that other foreign countries can invest here for diversification. The government emphasizes mining, agriculture, and tourism. In agriculture Mongolia imports about 40% of its food (including staples such as flour, rice and sugar) from China. Before 1991, much basic food, such as potatoes, was raised in Mongolia, but with enterprise privatization and loss of state subsidies, domestic food production suffered. Unprocessed raw materials occupy up to 90% of exports to China. Foreign investment has risen from \$965,000 in 1990 to \$350 million in 1999, with nearly 70% in geology, mining and prospecting. In the past ten years, 26% of foreign investment came from Hong Kong, with 18.8% from China, 6.7% from Korea, 5.6% U.S., and 4.5% Russian. [25]

In December, 1998 President Bagabandi visited China – the highest level visit by a Mongolian official to China since Tsedenbal in 1962. China agreed to provide soft loan credits of \$12 million to Mongolia, and there were talks on the gas pipeline from Russia through Mongolia, as well as a \$39.7 million deal to build Mongolia's first oil refinery. Since 1990 through 1998, Chinese traders invested \$60 million in Mongolia. In 1994 the two countries signed a new treaty defining bilateral relations. At the time, trade with China occupied 30% of Mongolian foreign trade, and trade in 1997 was five times that of 1990. [26]

On January 20, 2000 the government announced that a \$3 billion pipeline to supply China with oil from Russia might pass through Mongolian territory. The original pipeline concept, starting from Angarsk in Russia to Beijing, will travel a total of 2315 km, with 1000 km along Mongolian rail lines. Mongolia anticipated earning \$20 million annually from the pipeline, as well as a better supply of oil products and more jobs. [27] The latest news, however, has been that a longer route bypassing Mongolia was chosen, so that it would contribute to development of China's Northeast, at the expense of Mongolia. In 2000, Mongolia faced serious curtailment of fuel supplies from Russia, which had its own shortages, and was the main supplier, further heightening energy insecurities. Energy supplies remain a serious crimp in Mongolia's economic growth.

### 3. The cashmere industry: A case of Chinese economic penetration?

Mongolia's cashmere industry illustrates how economics could be a weapon of Chinese national interest, at the expense of a neighbor state. The cashmere industry has been a controversial test case for Mongolia-China economic relations. In 1998, the industry accounted for 15% of Mongolia's GDP, directly and indirectly employing around 10,000 workers. Chinese merchants have been paying higher prices for the raw cashmere, which is then sent to China for processing. Mongolian processors could only pay \$35-38 versus Chinese prices of \$40-42 per kilogram. After significant investment in processing equipment, Mongolia has seen supplies severely decrease, causing extensive layoffs. Critics fear a Chinese policy to take over Mongolia's 30% of world market and create a monopoly by driving Mongolian processors out of business. They point to the state-owned China Agricultural Bank providing interest-free loans to 22 Chinese cashmere companies as evidence. Apologists say the Chinese are simply better businessmen.

Mongolia produces average of 3,500 tons of cashmere annually. Of the 46 companies involved in purchasing and processing cashmere in Mongolia, 22 are Chinese, and an investigation in May 2000 indicated that 15 of these were not in conformity with the law that requires processing in Mongolia to qualify for a tax exemption. Also, some companies operated in Mongolia without

legal registration. A similar situation is emerging in the trade in wool and sheepskins, with Chinese high prices removing a raw material from the country.

In early May, 2000 the government of Mongolia imposed a temporary moratorium on the export of raw cashmere, since native companies were laying off employees for lack of material. This action appears to violate rules of the WTO, which Mongolia joined in the 1990s, and China is pressuring to end the moratorium. Most of the Chinese merchants are Han, with little understanding of Mongolia. In textiles, the Chinese factories have a better record, and export practically all their product, with most going to the U.S. to take advantage of a high quota for Mongolia textiles. Their profits tend to be reinvested in Mongolia. Without solid evidence, it would be wrong to accuse China of pursuing a policy to take over Mongolia's major "cash cow" – the cashmere industry. But there is no denying that better funded Chinese buyers are a threat to their under-capitalized Mongolia counterparts, and pose a real economic threat. What is a marginal benefit to China is vital to Mongolia, and a weaker Mongolia could result in a more dependent economic relationship.

#### 4. Human Security – the territorial dimension

Geography has certainly influenced – if not dominated - Mongolia's destiny. The country is bordered on the north by Russia, and with Soviet collapse, troops were pulled out, leaving garrison sites as virtual ghost towns, with unknown toxic and possibly radioactive waste dumps. Nevertheless, post-Communist Russia continues to exercise economic influence. When Russian fuel supplies declined, exports to Mongolia were interrupted – the only source for them. In 2000, Mongolia began to import fuel in small quantities from China. Too great dependency on China for anything so strategic as energy would only trade one patron for another.

Mongolia has a 4,673 km border with China's Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, and shares its border with Russia for 3,441 km. This long boundary has been relatively stable since the 1920s. Today, there is no longer Russian support for Mongolian territorial integrity, although a cooperative relationship exists. [28] Management of long borders with its two neighbors has been an ongoing concern. The frontiers are sparsely populated and relatively open. Maintaining control of borders is a vital part of preserving Mongolian sovereignty. Under joint agreement, inspection of border markers is underway. China and Mongolia signed a 1964 protocol to have border inspections every five years. The last full checks occurred in 1984, and took over two years. Today, many markers and stations are reported in disrepair. [29]

At present, there are no immediate military threats to Mongolia, and Tuvan cattle rustlers are far more an annoyance than a threat to national security. Yet Mongolia cannot fail to be vigilant on

its borders, for what is annoying and criminal today, could become political and threatening in the future if ignored and unchecked.

## 5. Comprehensive Security – the demographic dimension

Mongolia has a population of over 2.3 million, and could possibly sustain 4-5 million. Its southern neighbor has 1.3 billion people and is increasing at a rate of one Mongolia every 55 days! Border control is a vital part of comprehensive security to prevent smuggling and illegal migration – a growing problem throughout the world. But a more crucial issue is the dynamics of demography for Mongolia. Harsh climate and topography will fate Mongolia to sparse population – only 1% of the land is considered arable. About 27% of Mongolians live in Ulaanbaatar. Registration for residence there costs citizens Tugrik 26000 for adults, and 13000 for children. [30] A Centre for Civil Registration centralizes and coordinates citizen registration, issuing certificates and passports. Acquisition or loss of citizenship is no easy matter – only four persons were granted citizenship last year – a process that requires approval of the national President.

Chinese migration is increasingly a strategic issue. In the early 1990s, an estimated 100,000 Chinese were entering the U.S. annually. [31] Today Canada is receiving a similar number, while large numbers of Chinese migrants are on the move to many other countries – both legally and illegally. Economic migration is the main motivation, ironically at a time when economic growth is at an all time high. Many Chinese worry about future instability, and have good reason – a growing population is placing severe strains on agriculture and sustainability of the food supply. Poor land-use planning, erosion, urban sprawl, and water shortages could lead to environmental refugees from China in the future – and Mongolia will be on the front line of any migrant overflow.

For the present, there is the policy of keeping Mongolia for Mongolians. In 1994, the government established the Council of Foreigner Affairs under the Ministry of Justice, to supervise foreigners living in Mongolia. So far it has deported 41 persons, and denied 30 residence privileges. The Council has fifteen members, including top representatives from the Ulaanbaatar municipal government, intelligence, border guards, central police, the Foreign Ministry, customs service, the Foreign Investment Board, and the Council on National Security. It reports annually to the President.

The Hural annually sets limits on the proportion of foreign residents. Currently, no more than 1% of population can be foreign, and of these, 0.33% of any one nationality. Mongolia also tries to discourage Mongolians from emigrating or becoming foreign citizens. An official breakdown of foreign residents indicates around 1,500 Chinese, an equal number of Russians, with another 400

from other countries and 60 “stateless” persons. This works out to 0.14% foreigners, well below the Hural limits, but may not reflect reality.

To insure that unrestricted immigration does not endanger the Mongolian population, the government is tightening its borders and residence controls over foreign citizens. After 1990, there was a rapid increase of Chinese border entries, but generally a greater number of Mongolians go to China than Chinese into Mongolia. In April 2000, 6462 Chinese entered Mongolia legally; and 5643 Chinese exited Mongolia. In 1999, total of 58,346 Chinese entered Mongolia; 58,616 exited Mongolia. Based on January-April figures, the government estimates that figures were about the same for 2000. Diplomats and officials do not require visas, so are not counted. A new law [32] imposes heavy fines on officials and organizations who fail to get state permission in recruiting foreigners to work in Mongolia. This requires submission of detailed terms of employment and permission from the Labour Coordination Office. In 2000, the Office permitted 3,885 foreign citizens from 56 countries to work in Mongolia.

#### .07. A FINAL NOTE -- COMPREHENSIVE AND HUMAN SECURITY (Return to Index)

Mongolia today is in a precarious, though not critical, situation in the aftermath of the Cold War. The policy of maintaining good relations with both China and Russia, as well as vigorously reaching out to third countries, offers a realistic navigation route for the ship of state. Unless Mongolia can consolidate a stable political system and strengthen its economy, its recent democracy and independence will be vulnerable to Chinese pressures as well as to destabilization from within.

In the brave new world of multipolarism and notions of human, comprehensive, and cooperative security, the inter-state frictions and conflicts of the past were expected to decline – if not disappear. Certainly conflict resolution in trouble spots such as the Korean Peninsula is making progress, but these bright spots are counterbalanced by events in Africa and the Balkans. If we measure international politics only by a scorecard of conflicts and conflict resolution, however, we omit the developmental dimensions of historical patterns and precedents, strategic planning, and sudden change.

Human security represents a change of emphasis from past concerns over national security – the former stresses the centrality of individuals, while the latter seeks to preserve the nation-state – even at the expense of individuals. Human security is a concept rooted in Western liberal thought, and sets up an implicit tension between individuals and sovereign states. It is a doctrine that helps to bypass or pressure governments to address problems of well-being of their citizens, whether governments wish to or not.

Comprehensive security is a compromise between national and human security – it assumes that what is good for the state, will be good for the individuals within the state. Land mine bans and traffic in small arms are examples of the congruence of these two classes of security. As a compromise, comprehensive security carries an ambiguity that allows stress on individuals or the state, and thus may be more acceptable to non-democratic states such as China. Moreover, human security, with its stress on individuals and human rights, seeks to reduce negative state control over citizens. Comprehensive security allows state-centered priorities to dominate policy-making and strategic planning, without the stark realpolitik of appeals to national security.

.08. NOTES (Return to Index)

\* For the text of the constitution, see [http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/mg00000\\_.html](http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/mg00000_.html). Chapter 1 is devoted to sovereignty, and the first line of the preamble states: “We, the people of Mongolia: Strengthening the independence and sovereignty of the nation, Cherishing human rights and freedoms, justice, and national unity, Inheriting the traditions of national statehood, history, and culture...”

\*\* Introductory remarks: Ms Eimi Watanabe, Assistant Secretary General, United Nations, and Director, Bureau of Development Policy, UNDP, Beijing Workshop on human security, October 31, 2000.

[1] Research was made possible by a Special Project Grant from the Department of National Defence Canada. The author alone is responsible for all statements and conclusions, and nothing should be interpreted as reflecting Government of Canada policy or perspective.

[2] Estimated, July 2000, <http://www.britannica.com>

[3] Signed on March 12, 1936 the pact was protested by the Chinese government in Nanjing as a breach of Moscow’s “pledge to recognize it as part of China.” Ram Rahul. *Afghanistan, Mongolia and China*. (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 1992), p. 28.

[4] *Mongolian Messenger*, September 8, 1999, 8

[5] Rahul, p. 31.

[6] Rahul, p. 37.

[7] P. 43. He also notes that past Soviet-Mongolian treaties had aimed at Japan, but the 1966 treaty was aimed at potential Chinese aggression.

[8] P. 45.

[9] Alan J.K. Sanders, *Mongolia: Politics, Economics and Society*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987), 149.

[10] Mongolia Ministry of Defense. *Mongolian Defense White Paper*. (Ulaanbaatar: Ministry of Defense, 1998), p. 19.

[11] White Paper, p. 120.

[12] White Paper, pp. 21-22.

[13] White Paper, p. 19.

[14] Chen Kaizeng, "Prospects for the Relations among Great Powers in the New Century," *International Strategic Studies*, No. 56 (April, 2000), pp. 1-3.

[15] Chen, p. 2.

[16] Cooperative security has been defined in another context as: "denoting a specific inclusive type of relationship: cooperation on security issues between putative opponents." Olav F. Knudsen, *Cooperative Security in the Baltic Sea Region*. (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1998), p. 4.

[17] Huang Zhenji, "The New Multipolar World as I See It.," *International Strategic Studies*, No. 56 (April, 2000), pp. 4-10.

[18] Huang, p. 7.

[19] Luo Renshi, *International Strategic Studies*, No. 56 (April, 2000), pp. 11-17.

[20] Now that President George W. Bush is shifting U.S. foreign policy from Clintonian multipolarity to modified unipolarity stressing American national interests, Chinese strategic thinking will necessarily undergo some modification.

[21] "Relevance of Sun Zi's Military Thinking to Government of the State and the Armed Forces in the Present Times," *International Strategic Studies*, No. 56 (April, 2000), pp. 18-25.

[22] Ibid. 20-21.

[23] Interview at Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade Agency.

[24] All dollar figures in U.S. currency.

[25] Mongolian Messenger, February 23, 2000, p. 4.

[26] Mongolian Messenger, December 16, 1998, p. 3.

[27] Mongolian Messenger,, January 26, 2000, p. 1.

[28] Border problems of smuggling and cattle rustling have become irritants on the Mongolia-Russia border. A joint Conference was held in Irkutsk on February 18, 2000 to address these concerns. Mongolian Messenger, March 2, 2000, p. 2.

[29] Mongolian Messenger, May 5 1999, p. 8.

[30] Mongolian Messenger, February 17, 1999, p. 6

[31] Paul J. Smith, "The Strategic Implications of Chinese Emigration." *Survival*. (36:2, Summer 1994), p. 60.

[32] From June 1, 2001. Mongolian Messenger, April 25, 2001, p. 5.